1. INTRODUCTION IT IS WELL KNOWN that the general competitive model is not an appropriate theoretical account of market situations with large nonconvexities. While this is a basic failure we may nevertheless stress the qualification "large." If individual (consumers or producers) nonconvexities are small relative to the size of the economy, then aggregation effects should be expected to arise and to cancel, on the average, the individual "discontinuous" behavior. This is, of course, a familiar fact and in the set-up of a pure exchange economy-the only market problem that shall concern us from now on-rigorous models have been presented by Starr [25] and Aumann [I] . Those authors have shown that if there is a large number of traders (in Aumann's case, a continuum), then an appropriately defined competitive equilibrium does exist (approximately, in Starr's case). More precisely, an equilibrium in the Starr and Aumann sense (or, for that matter, in the ArrowDebreu sense) is defined as a price vector and an allocation of goods such that markets are cleared and consumers maximize preferences on their budget sets.
Important as those results are, the notion of equilibrium they deal with has some unattractive features. In particular, knowledge by the consumers of the equilibrium price system (plus the preference maximization hypothesis) does not determine the equilibrium; one needs, in addition, a possibly very careful specification of each consumer's commodity bundles. This makes the equilibrium a "decentralized" one only in some weak sense. Even at the technical level, this problem with the determinateness of equilibrium creates many difficulties. For example, on its account, the limit theorems for the core with nonconvex consumer preferences are weaker and more complex than the corresponding ones with convex preferences (see Hildenbrand [17, 3.31) .
It is the purpose of this paper to improve (at some cost, obviously) on the above situation with the help of the concept of a regular economy. This notion was introduced by Debreu [4] and the "generic" approach (i.e., "focus on the general case") which underlies it rests on the exploitation of smoothness hypothesis. So, we shall restrict ourselves to a world with smooth preferences; this implies a restriction of substance: indivisible commodities are ruled out.
In [4] Debreu dealt with a finite number of traders which were implicitly assumed to have convex preferences. His analysis has been extended by H. Dierker [ l l ] to exchange economies with infinitely many traders (formalized according to Hildenbrand [17] ) having convex preferences. The present study can be viewed as an extension of H. Dierker's work to economies with nonconvex preferences.
Following Hildenbrand [17] we define an economy (more properly a continuum economy) to be a distribution with compact support in a metric space of traders' characteristics. In our case, those are endowments and (smooth) preferences equipped with a cl-type metric. Two topologies (the a and the P ) for economies are considered. In the a one, being close means that the distributions are close with respect to the weak convergence and that mean endowments are close. In the p topology, being close means that the distributions are close in the a sense and, moreover, that their supports are also close. Both topologies have been used by Hildenbrand [I71 and H. Dierker [ l l ] .
Starr [25] and Hildenbrand, Schmeidler, and Zamir [18] have established that, under appropriate conditions, large economies have approximate equilibria. As a complement to their result we show that there exists a P-open and dense set of economies such that if one considers a sequence of finite economies with an increasing number of participants and "limit" in this set then, eventually, an exact equilibrium exists.
While the result of the last paragraph is probably good enough for the sake of arguing that the exploitation of differentiability assumptions in the present context is not pointless, it is not yet a very useful one. The reason is that the open-dense set identified is not of general relevance, i.e., it "works" for the particular property contemplated in that paragraph but not for others. What one wants is a notion of regularity that, as in the convex case, is intrinsically defined (i.e., not with relation to some particular property) and implies strong determinateness of equilibrium properties (and we are purposely vague on which those are).
With the motivation given at the beginning of this introduction, we propose to define an economy as regular if, in the first place, for every equilibrium price, all consumers in the economy (more precisely, all consumers with characteristics in the support of the measure describing the economy) have a unique, nondegenerate maximizer in their budget sets. Since this implies that the mean excess demand correspondence of the economy is a c1function in a neighborhood of the equilibrium set, we further require that, at every equilibrium price, its derivative map be of maximal possible rank (this last part is nothing but the notion of regularity used by Debreu [4] and H. Dierker [Ill) . Observe that, in a regular economy, the patterns of equilibria appear "locally" as in a convex economy.
Let us parenthetically observe that this definition of regularity is quite demanding. It is doubtful, however, that anything weaker would be of any use, at least in the present distribution approach to the modeling of the space of large economies. It may be possible that in a more stringent parametric approach (see Sondermann [24] ) to the same problem one could exploit a notion of regularity defined much the same way except that now "all consumers in the economy" would mean "almost all" in the measure theoretic sense, rather than "all which have characteristics in the support of the measure." So far, however, the development of this program of work has been hindered by the difficulties of obtaining suitable smoothness properties for aggregate demand.
Clearly, the set of regular economies is open in the P topology (it is obviously not so in the cr one) but, unfortunately, it is not p-dense. We can prove, however (and this is the main result of this paper), that it is dense in the (weaker) cr topology. To the extent that the cr and P topologies are not terribly dissimilar, the result can probably be read as asserting the "bigness" of the set of regular economies.
THE MODEL
A. Notation Let X be a topological space and A, B cX; A, bdry A, int A, and A\B stand, respectively, for closure, boundary, interior, and set theoretic subtraction. For x, y E R~, X > >~ means meansxi>yi f o r a l l i , x a y m e a n s x i~y i f o r a l l i , a n d x > y x s y but not y a x ; R : = { x~R " : x a o ) . The Euclidean norm in R n is 1/ 11; B,(x)={y ~R " : / / y -x / j <~} ; ~x i~.~h e c o n v e x h u l l o f~~R n / X / = X~=~ iscoA.If f : U + R ", U c Rm,is a c1function, Df(x), Vf(x) are, respectively, the derivative map and the gradienf vector at x E U.
B. Preferences
The consumption set is P = {x E R ':x >> 0).
DEFINITION: A preference relation 2 cP x P is a reflexive, transitive, complete preorder on P. A 2 is monotone if x 3 y implies x >y.
DEFINITION: A function u :P +R is a utility function for Z if "x Z y @ u ( x ) s 2. 4 (Y1." DEFINITION: A monotone preference relation 2 is Cr(2 <r <a)if:
(1) for all x E P, the closure in R ' of {y E P : y 2 x} is contained in P ; (2) the set {(x, y )~ P x P :x Z y, y 2 x} is a C r manifold, (2') 2 has a C' utility function u :P + R. with no critical point, i.e., Vu(x);tO for a11 x E P .~ That (2') implies (2)is clear. To see that (2)implies (27, suppose first that for every y E P there is an open neighborhood y E U and a c2function u: U + R such that Du(x) # 0 for x E U and "x Z z (j u(x)2 u(z)" for x, z E U; via an easy compactness argument reiterated application of the implicit function theorem yields then that the function x + A(x) implicitly defined by u(x)= u(A(x)e), where e = (1, ...,I), is c2and has no critical point; this function is a utility for 2 .To verify that (2) implies for every y E P the existence of an appropriate local utility, let y E U and h: U x U +R be a C' function such that Dh(y, y)#O and "x Z z , z Z x e h ( x , z ) = 0" for x, z E U. Note (this is simply seen) that Dh(y, y ) has the form (f(y), -f(y)); suppose fl(y)# 0. Then the function x +A(x)implicitly defined by h(A(x), f2(y), .. . ,fl(y), x)= 0 is c2in some U ' c U(y E U') and DA(x)#O (in particular, a,A(x)= 1) for x E U'.
The set of Crmonotone preference relations is denoted 9:.We are primarily concerned with r = 2; let 9:= 9,.
A preference relation 2 is convex if {y E P :y Z x) is convex for every x E P. It will be convenient to denote by 9 the set df continuous (i.e., closed) monotone preference relations on R: (i.e., 2 c R: y R:). In the obvious way, 9, can be regarded as a subset of 9 (extend 2 E PSto R: by letting "y E dRf, 3 x 2 y for all x").
Denote by % the set of c2functions u :P+ R with the property that, for all x E P, Vu(x)>>O and the closure in R: of {y E P: u ( y ) s u(x)} is contained in P.
Every 2 E 9,has a utility function in % and, conversely, every function u s % induces a 2. E 9, by letting "x 2. y @ u ( x ) s u (y)." From now on, by a utility for a 2 E 9,we always mean a member of %. The Hessian matrix of u E % at x E P is denoted Hu(x).
DEFINITION: E 9, if, letting u be a utility for 2 , A point x E P is regular for 2 the form Hu(x) restricted to Ker Du(x) = {y E R ' :Du(x)y = 0) has full rank or, equivalently, if x is a nondegenerate critical point of u j~e r Du(x).
It is immediately verified that the definition of regular point does not depend on the particular u chosen. At any rate, this is implied by the following well-known fact (see, for example, H. Dierker [lo,p. 591). Let u E % be a utility for Z E 9, and, for every x E P, put x* = (xl, . . . ,xi-') and take a neighborhood x* c U c R'-' small enough to be able to implicitly define a function ( [ u , u(x)J : U + R by u(y, t[u, u(x)] (y)) = u(x). Denoting by H [[u, u(x) ] (y) the Hessian matrix at y, one has:
x E P is a regular point for Z E P, if and only if, letting u E % be a utility for 2 , rank Ht[u, u(x)](x*)= 1 -1.
If every x E P is regular for Z E P,, we say that 2 is regular. Observe that every regular Z E 9, is convex.
The importance of regular points stems from the following, easily verified, property:
Let p E R', p >> 0, w E P, and x E P be regular for 2 . Suppose that, letting u be a utility for 2 , the system (Vu(x) = Ap, px = pw) has a solution A E R. Then there are open sets (p, w )~ R' x P, x E U2,and a (2' Ulc function f: U1+ U2 such that every (p', w', x') E Ul x U2 satisfies the above system for some A', if and only if x l = f(pl, o').
L e t e z ( 1 , . . . ,~) E P , %~= { u E % : u ( A~) = A forallA>O}.Every2 €9,hasa unique utility function in %', denoted u,.
For every 2 E 9, define g,
ll where u is a utility for Z ;this definition is obviously independent of the particular u chosen.
We endow P, with the topology induced by the (2' uniform convergence on compacta of the g,'s functions. It has been used by H. Dierker [ l l ] and we refer to her for a discussion of its reasonableness. In particular, 8,becomes a separable, metrizable space.
We remark that, if % is endowed with the topology of Cruniform convergence on compacta, the map u H Z from % to 8, is open and continuous, hence an identification. So, the topology on 9, is nothing but the identification topology induced by this map (Dugundji [12, VI.11).
C. Economies and Equilibrium
The space of consumer's characteristics is d = 8,x P (with the product topology); generic elements of d are a = (2 ., w,). As in H. Dierker [11] and, in a formally similar context, Delbaen [S] and K. Hildenbrand [16] , we have the following definition:
DEFINITION: An economy is a (Borel) probability measure u on d with compact support and such that, denoting by v, the marginal distribution of u on P and by i :P + P the identity map, one has J i dv, << co (bounded mean initial endowments).
As it will become clear in Section 4 on finite economies, the entity we call now an economy would more properly be called "abstract," "infinite," or "atomless" economy. Since we will deal with finite economies only tangentially, no confusion will arise; but it is important for the understanding of the equilibrium notion to be defined to bear in mind that the intended interpretation of an economy v presupposes a continuum of consumers.
Define 
DEFINITION: p E d ois an equilibrium price vector for v if 0 E @,(p).
Denote by n(v) the set of equilibrium price vectors for v. By (6), n ( v ) is a nonempty, compact set (Hildenbrand [17, p. 1501 ).
D. Space ofEconomies
Let A be the set of economies. We will consider two topologies (the a and P topologies) on A. The a topology is the one mainly used by Hildenbrand [17] , while both have been utilized by him and by H. Dierker [ l l ] . We refer to them for a discussion of their reasonableness. The P topology is stronger, but only "slightly," than the a. For definitions of the mathematical concepts to which we appeal, see Hildenbrand [17] . 
E. Finite Economies
An economy as so far defined is nothing but a model for a finite, large economy. As those are not the main focus of the present paper, we shall be somewhat loose in this section.
Let T be a generic symbol for a nonempty, finite indexing set. Afinite economy cardinality (i.e., n) distribution (i.e., vzs,), and mean endowments.
F. RegularEconomies
In this section a certain simple notion of regularity for a v in A is proposed. We discuss some of its properties and investigate the relative position of the set of regular economies in A . A more informal discussion of the regularity problem in the present nonconvex preferences setup is deferred until the next section.
DEFINITION: cj, is C' at P E A ' if cj, happens to be a C' function on a neighborhood of p.
It is immediately verified that if @, is transversal to 0, then #17(v)<a. We now state an important condition for a v E A : (8) For every a E supp (v) and p E 17(v), # cp (a, p) = 1 and cp (a, p) is a regular point for 2 , (see Figure 2 ).
If (8) Heuristically, we could say that if v is regular, then in a neighborhood of the (compact) set J , = { (~,~,~) E s u~~(~) x P x~(~) :~E~ everything looks as in a regular economy with convex preferences. Hence, any result for regular, convex economies whose proof uses the convexity property of preferences only on arbitrarily small neighborhoods of J, does generalize to regular nonconvex economies. Thus, consider the following two important properties for a 17 E A . (9) 17 is /3-continuous at i; and there is a p neighborhood of i;, i; E U c A , such that #17(v) is finite and constant on U (see Figure 3) . (i) to isolate some interesting and strong notion of regularity, examine its properties and see how far one can go in approaching the open and dense desideratum; this is the program pursued in this paper;
(ii) to conclude that we cannot "make up" with smoothness hypothesis (local by nature) for the nonconvexities of the problem (with its implied abrupt, discontinuous in the large, agents' behavior), drop them and settle for obtsining the strongest determinateness-of-equilibria property one can hope for in a framework of continuity assumptions, namely, the existence of a dense set of economies such that every economy in the set is a continuity point of the equilibrium correspondence and has a finite number of equilibria. This continuity-framework analysis of the equilibrium correspondence shall be pursued elsewhere [23]in a context where commodities are available only in discrete (i.e., indivisible) amounts. There is gain, and no loss, of conceptual generality in doing so; the hypothesis of perfect divisibility for commodities is of no substance in itself. It is rather a prerequisite for the exploitation of the powerful analytical tools of convexity and differentiability theory, if neither convexity nor smoothness are present, we can do as well without divisibility of commodities.
PROOF OF THE THEOREMS
The P-openness of is clear enough; we shall skip a formal proof.
Let A" = {v E A: if a E supp (v), then w, < e and 2, is regular, convex}. (14) and E is close enough to 0, v: will satisfy (15) (take into account (7) and the fact supp (v:)\supp (v,) c supp (v)). Therefore, following Steps 1 through 5 we end up with a v satisfying (8); a new application of Step 4 will yield a regular v.
The approximation embodied in Step 4 is in the a sense, but a more refined argument could replace this step by an equivalent P approximation. The only place where a rather than P is essential is in Step 5.
We skip the proofs of Step 1, which is a well-known fact, and Step 4, which follows immediately applying the perturbation of initial endowments argument of E. and H. Dierker [lo, p. 8721. The proof of Step 2 is a transversality one (i.e., counting of equations and unknowns).
Step 3 is, essentially, a "smoothing by aggregation" (see, for example, Sondermann 1221) result restricted to a neighborhood of 17(v).
Step 5 appeals to the recent literature on the characterization of excess demand functions (specifically, to the strengthening in [22] of a result of Debreu 161; see also, Mantel 1201); the reason why this line of work turns out to be relevant in the present context can be, informally, easily understood. After Step 4 the set of "troublesome" a E supp (v) is very smal!; we replace it by another set of consumers having smooth, convex preferences and, as a group, nearly the same excess demand correspondence; clearly the resulting economy approximates in the a sense (but not in the p sense).
From now on, k(a, x) # 0 is a short-hand for "x is a regular point of 2.."
In order to prove Theorem 2, let Af = {vE A : for some p E H(v) and all q(a, p) PROPOSITION: For every r and x E Tr there is L E Sfr with x E L such that d= {a E (% X P),: FL,a A J(K) for every K} is a Baire set.
Suppose, for the moment, that the proposition is true. Then for every r there is a countable collection Trof L c 9" whose interiors cover Tr. The set nrnLEz, dL is dense in (%" X P)". We claim that every a E nrnL,zrdLsatisfies (13) .
Note that, for all r, L, and K, dimension domain FL,, = (I-1)+ I + F(l+ 1 ) s codimension of J(K), equality holding if and only if kjh = 1-1 for all jh. Therefore, {(x, p, t): ?PL,a(~, p, t )~ = 1 for all jh J(K)} is a discrete (resp. empty) set if kjh 1-(resp. kjh <1-1for some jh).
Let &(a) = {p E U(a): for all j and z E cp(aj, p), k(z, a,) # 0). By taking into account (Caratheodory's theorem) that every point of co cp(aj, p ) can be written as , We let a = (u, w ) . If ri = 0, then Rrl = {0}and we convene that the value of the Rri coordinate of is automatically defined to be 0. Xi cui(X2=o tjhnxjhn -wi) = 0; SO, if we put xih =hh(p) and let x be in the interior of L E 2 ' 'we can assume that for all n, ?PL,a(xn, p,, t,) E J(K)where kih = 1-1for all jh. Since this equation has a discrete set solution, the sequence p, is trivial (i.e., p, = p for all but finitely many n); hence, being n ( a ) compact, we conclude #1T(a)<oo.
We now proceed to prove the proposition. We only show that SZL is dense; that it is in fact a Baire set follows by noting that every dlkis u-compact and !PL,ahas a compact domain.
Pick an arbitrary d = (E, ( 5 )~ (aw X P)" and let r, f E Tr be given. Pick any L E~'w i t h f~L .
Write any y E R' in the form y = (y *, y'), where y * = (y l, . . . ,yl-I). is surjective (in fact, the identity map), and DqF3 The desired conclusion follows.
Now define
With respect to the factor R'j the same conventions as in footnote 3 apply. PROOFOF STEP3: Let v satisfy (13) . Denote supp v = {al, . . . ,a,}; without possible confusion we regard ai as a member of ("1C x P)", i.e., ai = (ui, mi), v=Xjn=1 aisaj; 17(v)={p,, . . . ,pa}.
Because of (4) there is p >0 and, for every 1S i s n, an open set pi E Ui c A'-' such that for any 1 s j < m and x E cp(ai, pi) there is a c1function fii,: ui+B,(x) with the property that k(a,, y)#O for any y EB,(x) and " p~ u, y EB,(x), (~/ I V U , (~)~) V U , (~) p, py =pwj" if and only if y =fijX (p).
=
We assume that, for all j, the sets {B,(x): x E cp(aj, p), p E 17(v)} are pairwise disjoint; let JiXi UXEp(ai,P,~4 = U:=l Jli. We assume that i # it implies
We shall proceed by replacing every Sai by a vi with the property that the compact set supp (vi) is contained in a neighborhood of a, as small as we wish and cp, is a c1function on u.This quite suffices since, letting v'= X711 aiv,, cp,, will be c1 on and, being v' as close as we wish to v, we can assume that (i) 17(v1) c U,
(ii) k(a, y)# 0 for all j, a E supp vi and y € 4 , and (iii) cp(a, p ) € J j for all j, a E supp(vi) and p E 17(vt).
From now on we consider a single fixed j. For notational economy we drop, when there is no ambiguity, the subscript j.
For every 1<i <n let cp (a, pi) = {xil, . . . ,xisi}, Bi,h = Bw(xih), f i h =fiirih. Of course, cp(a, p ) c U;;=,{fih(p)} for every p E 0,.
Let Eihc P, 1<i c n, 1<h S si, be a collection of pairwise disjoint relatively compact neighborhoods of the Bib's. Let Define v, = p 0 V-I ; clearly supp (v,) is compact since supp (vi)c V(supp P ) and V is continuous. By taking y small enough, v, is arbitrarily close to 6,.
It remains to prove that p, is C 1on every U,.
Let p E oi and h # h'; then
vih'} and this ~, ( f i h ' (~) ) } ( 0 E T : u(fih3(p))-( f i h (~)
) Uihlast set, which is the intersection of T with an hyperplane, has Lebesgue, hence p, measure zero. Therefore, given p E oi, p(a,, p ) will be a singleton for p-a.e. v E T and so, p (v,, p We have that vn + 5 weakly because v(Un)+ 0. We have j i dvF+j i d5 because the bound 6 on initial endowments is independent of n. Hence, z j n %5.
~o r pãnd l S h S s i l e t A h ( p ) = { v € T:p(a,,p)=fih(p)}.Then p(vi,p)=
Q.E.D.
PROOFOF THEOREM2: We can assume v satisfies (13) . We want vn +v with vn € Af.
P

As in
Step 3 let supp v = {al, . . . ,a,}, aj E (% x P)",aj = (u], mi), v = XF1 cxj Sai.
Pick p ~1 7 ( v ) arbitrarily. Then O=X;l aiyi for some y i~c o @(ai, p [lo] .
From now on we consider a single fixed j. For notational economy we drop when there is no ambiguity the subscript j. What will be done is illustrated in Figure 4 .
Let Then ah is as close as we wish to a, cp(ah, p)=xh and, of course, k(ah, xh) f 0. Now define vi = x$=l tha,,.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we describe the example announced in Section 2. There are two commodities; taking p2 = 1, p will be the relative price of good 1. We start with an economy 1=$6,,++ a, , which is best described by the Edgeworth's box in Figure 5 . The excess demand correspondence of a, for commodity 1 in a neighborhood of p = 1is given in Figure 6 . Figure 7 describes excess demand correspondence (always for good 1) of 1. In particular, p = 1 is an equilibrium. The dotted lines in Figure 5 indicate "restricted" demand functions; i.e., we assume that there is an open se_t of prices U c R containing p = 1 such that for i = 1, 2: "if x E cp(ai, I), then there is a C' function f : u-+ R* with f ( l ) = x and the property that, in a neighborhood V of x and all p E U, f(p) is the unique element of V kai-maximal on the p-budget set. Moreover, a, f(p)> 0 for all p E U."
We can let U = (s, t) and assume @,(s)> 0, @,(t)< 0 (see Figure 7) .
Let 0c l be a P-open set of economies containing I and such that for every v E Q: (i) the bracketed statement of the last paragraph holds true, with respect to U, for every a E supp (v); (ii) $,(s)> 0, $,(t)<O. Clearly, the existence of such an open set follows by continuity arguments.
We will now argue that the set of economies at which the correspondence 17 is not stable (as C in Figure 8 ) lies dense in 0 (and, therefore, includes the whole of 0). Similar arguments would yieid the density in 0 of the discontinuity points of l7.
Let 6' be the set of v E 0 satisfying: (i) #supp (v)<m, (ii) for every a E supp (v), #{p E U:
# q(a, p)> I}< a.It is a simple argument to verify that 0' is dense in 0. It is clear that: for every v E 6" there is p E U such that p E n ( v ) and # q(a, p)> 1 for some a E supp (v). Indeed, in going from s to t, the graph of 4, has to cross the horizontal axis at some p "from above" but if # q(a, p ) = 1 for all a E supp (v), then the conditions defining O and 0' imply that $, is positively sloped at p. Hence the conclusion (see Figure 9 ). Let v E U and p E 17(v)n U be such that # q(a, p)> 1 for some a E supp (v). In an arbitrarily small neighborhood of p, $" looks as in x, E co q(a, p). Suppose that #q(d, p)>O, i.e., x, =qxl+(l-q)x2, OCq s 1, xl, X Z E q(6, p). Define from 6 two new a l , a 2 in the manner indicated in Figure 10 . The reader may verify that there is nothing special in the figure, the essential point is that for dl, i = 1,2, q(di, p)=xi and the indifference map remains unaltered in a neighborhood of xi. Define a new I by replacing dl, with weight qv(d), and d2, with weight (1 -q)v(d), for 6. Perform this same replacement operation for every a ~s u p p (v) with # q(a, p)> 1. At the end we get I such that: (i) I is arbitrarily close to v; (ii) p E l7(;); (iii) for every a E supp (I), # q(a, p ) = 1 and, therefore, @,is C' andpositively sloped atp. But then for an arbitrarily small neighborhood of p (take one in which 4, looks as in Figure 7 between s and t) if I is sufficiently close to v, the graph of $, has to cross the horizontal axis several times in this neighborhood (see Figure  11) . Hence, 17 is not stable at v and our claim is established.
